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Philosophy – Classics

Smith, A. ([1759] 2002). The Theory of Moral Sentiments Cambridge, U.K. ; New York:

Cambridge University Press.

Philosophy of mind

Andrews, K. (2004). How to Learn from Our Mistakes. Philosophical Explorations, 7(3), 247-

263.

Andrews, K. (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk

Psychology. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 191-209).

Dordrecht: Springer.

Bogdan, R. J. (2000). Tales of Many Minds. In Minding Minds : Evolving a Reflexive Mind by

Interpreting Others. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Brandom, R. (1994). Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Brandom, R. (1997). Precis of Making It Explicit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

57(1), 153-156.

Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating Reasons : An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, Mass.

; London: Harvard University Press.

Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. (1996): Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press).

Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2007). Baboon Metaphysics : The Evolution of a Social Mind.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Currie, G., & Sterelny, K. (2000). How to Think About the Modularity of Mind-Reading. The

Philosophical Quarterly, 50(199), 145-160.

Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 685-700.

Davidson, D. (1973). Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27(3-4), 313-328.

Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. (1982). Rational Animals. dialectica, 36(4), 317-327.

Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. (2004). Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, M. & Stone, T. (1995): Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell).

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - work in progress, do not quote - last edition: 20/04/08

Davies, M. and Stone T., eds., 1995, Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford:

Blackwell Publishers.

Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1990). The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts. Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, 50, 177-194.

Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea : Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New

York: Simon & Schuster.

Dokic, J. and Proust, J., eds., 2002, Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Advances in

Consciousness Research 45, John Benjamins.

Dunbar, R. (2003). Psychology. Evolution of the Social Brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160-1161.

Fodor, J. (1992): A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind. Cognition 44: 283-96.

Gallagher, S. (2007). Logical and Phenomenological Arguments against Simulation Theory. In

D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 63-78). Dordrecht: Springer.

Gallese, V. (2007). Before and Below ‘Theory of Mind’: Embodied Simulation and the Neural

Correlates of Social Cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological

Sciences, 362(1480), 659-669.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Folk Psychology under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's 'Animal

Action in the Space of Reasons'. Mind & Language, 18(3), 266-272.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk Psychology as a Model. Philosophers' Imprint, 5(6).

Goldie, P. (2007). There Are Reasons and Reasons. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk

Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 103-114). Dordrecht: Springer.

Gopnik, A. & Meltzoff, A. (1997): Words, Thoughts and Theories (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).

Gordon, R. M., and J. Barker, 1994, Autism and the theory of mind debate. In Philosophical

Psychopathology: A Book of Readings, G. Graham and L. Stephens, eds. MIT Press, pp. 163-

181.

Gordon, R., 1986, Folk Psychology as Simulation, Mind and Language 1, 158-171;

Gordon, R.M., 1995, Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator, Ethics 105:727-742.

Heal, J. (1994): Simulation vs. Theory-Theory: What's at Issue? In C. Peacocke (ed.),

Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hobson, R. (2007). We Share, Therefore We Think. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk

Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 41-61). Dordrecht: Springer.

Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. (1985): Folk Psychology is Here to Stay. Philosophical Review 94:

197-226.

Hurley, S. (2005). Social Heuristics That Make Us Smarter. Philosophical Psychology, 18, 585-

612.

Hutto, D. (2007). Folk Psychology without Theory or Simulation. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe

(Eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 115-135). Dordrecht: Springer.

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - work in progress, do not quote - last edition: 20/04/08

Economics and Social Cognition

Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory : Experiments in strategic interaction. New York,

N.Y. Princeton University Press.

Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006). When does “Economic man” Dominate social behavior?

Science, 311(5757), 47-52.

Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2004). Neuroeconomics: Why economics needs

brains. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 555-579.

Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). On the nature of fair behavior. Econ Inq, 41(1), 20-

26.

Glimcher, P. W., & Rustichini, A. (2004). Neuroeconomics: The consilience of brain and

decision. Science, 306(5695), 447-452.

Glimcher, P. W., Dorris, M. C., & Bayer, H. M. (2005). Physiological utility theory and the

neuroeconomics of choice. Games Econ Behav, 52(2), 213-256.

Haselhuhn, M. P., & Mellers, B. A. (2005). Emotions and cooperation in economic games. Brain

Res Cogn Brain Res, 23(1), 24-33.

Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., et al. (2005). “Economic

man” In cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behav

Brain Sci, 28(6), 795-815; discussion 815-755.

Ohmura, Y., & Yamagishi, T. (2005). Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders'

rejection in a truncated ultimatum game. Psychol Rep, 96(2), 533-541.

Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural

basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758.

Smith, K., & Dickhaut, J. (2005). Economics and emotion: Institutions matter. Games and

Economic Behavior, In Press, Corrected Proof.

van 't Wout, M., Kahn, R. S., Sanfey, A. G., & Aleman, A. (2006). Affective state and decisionmaking

in the ultimatum game. Exp Brain Res, 169(4), 564-568.

Walter, H., Abler, B., Ciaramidaro, A., & Erk, S. (2005). Motivating forces of human actions.

Neuroimaging reward and social interaction. Brain Res Bull, 67(5), 368-381.

Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punishment behavior. Proc Natl

Acad Sci U S A, 102(20), 7398-7401.

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - work in progress, do not quote - last edition: 20/04/08

Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2004). The neurobiology of trust. Ann N Y Acad Sci,

1032, 224-227.

Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2005). Oxytocin is associated with human

trustworthiness. Horm Behav, 48(5), 522-527

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